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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, economists claim that production is optimally determined by profit maximization and 
hence that new environmental regulations inevitably yield (weakly) lower profits. This view has been 
challenged by several authors, most notably Porter and van der Linde (1995). This relatively new 
strand of economics suggests several mechanisms linking better environmental performance to higher 
profits. For example, a better environmental profile can improve the energy efficiency of the firm, 
raise the motivation and productivity of the employees, or improve market shares (see e.g. Reinhardt 
1999, or Brekke and Nyborg 2004).  
 
In addition to theoretical arguments, the claim that better environmental performance can be profitable 
is often based on quantitative empirical studies revealing a positive association between economic and 
environmental performance.1 When interpreting such results, it is important to be aware of the 
shortcomings of the methods applied in these studies. As this paper will show, there are a number of 
unresolved problems when one wants to illuminate the relationship between environmental and 
economic performance of firms empirically. Hence, we argue that using empirical correlations 
evolving from the applied methods to conclude that the "results indicate that it 'pays to be green' as a 
rule" (Russo and Fouts 1997, p. 549) or, moreover, that the "results of this study suggest that it does 
indeed pay to be green" (Hart and Ahuja 1996, p. 34) is unwarranted.  
 
There are several reasons why it is important to improve our knowledge of the relationship between 
environmental and economic performance. First, documentation of a positive relationship between 
environmental and economic performance can be used to invoke environmental awareness among firm 
management or owners, claiming that actively pursuing an environmental profile can increase 
economic performance (Gallarotti 1995, Hart 1997, Orlitzky et al. 2003). Second, however, a positive 
association can also be used to argue that certain environmental regulations could be relaxed: If firm 
owners perceive that it pays to be green, they have economic incentives to implement environmentally 
sensitive production methods, and there is less need for further government interventions to secure 
good environmental performance (Orlitzky et al. 2003). Improving the flow of information about the 
relationship between economic and environmental performance can then be seen as a policy means to 
provide incentives for environmental improvements without expanding traditional regulations. Third, 
                                                     
1 Overviews of the empirical literature on the relationship between environmental and economic performance at the firm 
level, sometimes labeled the "pays to be green"-literature, are included in e.g. Griffin and Mahon (1997), Wagner et al. 
(2001), King and Lenox (2001) and Filbeck and Gorman (2004). 
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it seems reasonable that the relationship between environmental and economic performance can be 
positive for plants with certain characteristics, but not for all plants, and for some, but not all, elements 
of environmental performance. Identifying the characteristics of firms for which good environmental 
performance is positively associated with profitability can provide important information, especially 
for the enforcement of environmental regulations. An environmental agency may direct more 
inspections towards plants with a weak association between environmental and economic 
performance, presupposing that such plants need stronger incentives to comply with environmental 
regulations. Hence, knowledge of the relationship between environmental and economic performance, 
including knowledge of possible causal effects, is crucial for the construction of effective 
environmental regulations.  
 
There is a growing empirical literature on the relationship between environmental and economic or 
financial performance (see e.g. Filbeck and Gorman 2004 or Wagner 2001 for overviews). Examples 
of such studies are comparisons of the payoff of green funds compared to conventional ones, or the 
effect on stock values of environmentally related events. The relationship between economic and 
environmental performance is also studied by comparing various indices of the environmental (and 
social) profile with measures based on the market value of firms listed on the stock market (e.g. Konar 
and Cohen 2001, Ziegler et al. 2002, Filbeck and Gorman 2004). One problem using firms registered 
on the stock market is that such firms are normally big and diversely composed corporations, making 
it difficult to disentangle or comprehend the impact of environmental performance of particular 
manufacturing units on total corporate profits. Moreover, non-temporary increases in market value 
from improved environmental performance can only be expected if the profitability of firms with good 
environmental performance is actually higher than the profitability of other firms. Hence, several 
studies include measures of economic performance that are not connected with stock market 
expectations, like return on sales, capital, equity or assets (e.g. Jaggi and Freedman 1992, Hart and 
Ahuja 1996). The present paper focuses on studies applying such measures of firms' actual economic 
performance when investigating the relationship between environmental and economic performance at 
the firm level.  
 
The aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we discuss shortcomings in the methods applied in most 
of these previous quantitative firm level studies. For example, many studies in this literature do not 
control for variables likely to be important for the economic performance of firms, like type of sub-
industry or degree of environmental regulation. Such simple procedures are likely to yield an 
association between environmental and economic performance that is biased: The effect of omitted 
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variables that are correlated with both environmental and economic performance is loaded onto the 
estimated association between environmental and economic performance. The net effect of 
environmental performance on economic performance remains undisclosed. We argue that this and 
other shortcomings render the results of most of these previous studies difficult to interpret, and 
clearly inappropriate as support for a claim that it pays to be green. To our knowledge, no previous 
paper includes such a systematic discussion of the methods applied in this literature. Second, we apply 
similar (unsatisfactory) methods and thereby find a positive association between environmental and 
economic performance using a panel data set of Norwegian manufacturing plants covering more than 
10 years. However, by amending one important shortcoming of most previous studies2, namely the 
problem of omitted unobserved variables, the positive association between environmental and 
economic performance is no longer statistically significant. This further indicates that a conclusion 
that it pays to be green is premature.  
 
Some examples of previous empirical studies of the relationship between environmental and economic 
performance of firms are briefly surveyed in Section 2. More important, this section includes a 
discussion of the shortcomings of the applied methods, suggests ways of amending these 
shortcomings, and points at remaining econometric problems that are left for future research. Section 3 
presents the data applied in the present study, including a discussion of the applied measures of 
environmental and economic performance. We present the empirical results in Section 4 and conclude 
in Section 5. 
2. Previous empirical studies and their shortcomings 
2.1. Briefly on the theoretical background 
If improved environmental performance pays off, why do so many firms reveal a poor environmental 
performance? Rational agents responding to economic incentives would be environmentally friendly if 
it paid off, i.e. environmental management would be a widespread and integrated part of the overall 
corporate management. The fact that environmental performance is poor in many industries can be 
regarded as indication of a negative, rather than a positive, relationship between the two dimensions. 
 
                                                     
2 King and Lenox (2001) seems to be the only previous study in this field that addresses the problem of unobserved firm 
specific effects.  
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However, as pointed out by Palmer et al. (1995), there may be some overlooked benefits from 
environmental innovation, but the authors maintain that these are small compared to abatement and 
control costs. Improving environmental performance generally involves several types of cost: Search 
costs of identifying and analysing abatement options, costs regarding capital investments and 
crowding out of other investments, costs for operating and maintenaning equipment, and costs of 
shifting focus from production resources and R&D to production of nonmarketable output, etc. (see 
Jaffe et al. 1995 for a more detailed discussion). 
 
Those arguing for a positive causal relationship between environmental performance and profitability 
highlight the possibility of costs reductions and/or increased revenues. (see e.g. WBCSD 1997, 
Scmidtheiny and Zorraquin 1996, Bonifant et al. 1995, Porter and van der Linde 1995, Dechant and 
Altman 1994, Elkington 1994, Porter 1991). 
 
Regarding cost reductions, it has been argued that firms directing focus to pollution prevention 
discover opportunities for energy savings, waste reduction, recycling and lower packaging and 
transportation costs etc. It has also been argued that improved environmental performance increases 
labour loyalty, reduces the turnover, and improves the ability to hire and retain high quality staff, 
especially young and motivated workers who tend to be environmentally conscious. 
 
Another argument regards the cost of capital and the cost of insurance. Improving environmental 
performance might reduce the risk for accidents and the risk for legal sanctions. If successfully 
communicated to stakeholders, meaning that the perception of firm specific risk is reduced, this will 
lower the required return on capital and thus increase the share value. Reducing risk will also give 
lower insurance costs and lower interest rates on debt. 
 
Improved environmental performance could also lead to increased revenues if customers are 
concerned about environmental effects of the production process or the products, and thus have a 
higher willingness to pay for “green” than “brown” products. 
 
To sum up, there is a myriad of theoretical arguments supporting or opposing a positive relationship 
between environmental and economic performance. Still, to test the hypotesis that it pays to be green 
empirically remains difficult because formal theories are scarce or contain non-observable variables 
like e.g. employee motivation. These difficulties have not hindered attempts to test the hypotesis 
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empirically. As we shall now argue, however, most of these attempts suffer from serious 
shortcomings. 
2.2. Shortcomings of correlations studies 
Several previous studies have investigated the relationship between environmental and economic 
performance by calculating simple correlations coefficients. One early example is Bragdon and Marlin 
(1972) who estimate the correlation coefficient between economic and environmental performance for 
17 US companies in the Pulp and Paper industry. An index of the pollution control is used to measure 
environmental performance, while economic performance was measured by e.g. return on equity and 
capital. They find a positive correlation between environmental and economic performance, and 
conclude that "some degree of pollution control is likely to increase profits" (Bragdon and Marlin 
1972, p. 17).  
 
Jaggi and Freedman (1992) is another example. They estimate the correlation coefficient between 
several measures of economic performance (e.g. return on assets and return on equity) and an 
environmental index based on emissions to water for 13 Pulp and Paper firms in the USA in 1978. The 
estimated correlations show a negative association between environmental and economic performance, 
but the association is often statistically insignificant.  
 
Results emerging from application of such simple methods provide very limited, if any, guiding for 
the construction of regulatory policies. The reason is that the simple correlation cannot illuminate why 
greener plants are more profitable; it does not even provide information on what characterizes plants 
that are both greener and more profitable. The point is that this method only reveals the gross 
association between environmental and economic performance. Hence, the result could be due to 
omitted variables, like plant size or sub-industry. If e.g. plant size is omitted and correlated with both 
environmental and economic performance, then the effect of plant size on environmental performance 
is loaded onto the estimated association between environmental and economic performance. Hence, it 
is possible that the positive correlation would disappear once variables like firm size is controlled for 
(see discussion in e.g. Orlitzky 2001). In the next section we comment on some studies where control 
variables are included in an attempt to get closer to the net effect of environmental performance on 
economic performance.  
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2.3. Shortcomings of simple regression studies 
An increasing number of researchers have recognized the shortcomings of restricting the analysis to 
correlation coefficients, and therefore perform regression analyses where observed firm heterogeneity 
is accounted for, like in the following model:  
 
(1) = + + +i i i iECP a b ENP X d u , 
 
where ECPi is economic performance for plant i, ENPi is the environmental performance, Xi is a 
vector of control variables, and ui is an error term. Common control variables in previous studies are 
measures of firm size, capital, or sub-industry.  
 
Hart and Ahuja (1996) is a much-cited study, where environmental performance is measured as a sum 
of reduction in toxic release emissions. The economic performance of the included 127 US firms is 
measured by return on assets or return on sales for the years 1989-1992. The authors run regressions 
including some control variables and find a positive association between economic and environmental 
performance. This leads the authors to suggest that "it does indeed pay to be green". 
 
Russo and Fouts (1997) measure environmental performance by an environmental rating of firms 
based on compliance records, expenditures on waste reduction, etc. Economic performance is 
measured by return on assets. Data were available for 243 US firms for 1991 and 1992. A regression 
on (1) yields a positive and significant assosiation between economic and environmental performance. 
This leads the authors to conclude that the results indicate that "it pays to be green". 
 
Although (1) controls for several apparently relevant factors, unobserved variables could still be the 
main reason for the observed correlation. Imagine that e.g. good management or investment in 
efficient technology causes both environmental and economic performance to increase but are still 
omitted from the regression. Then we could observe a positive association between environmental and 
economic performance even if no relationship existed between them. Moreover, if omitted variables 
that influence economic performance, like the age of capital or quality of management, are correlated 
with environmental performance, an OLS regression on (1) would produce biased and inconsistent 
estimates. Such omitted variable bias is not unlikely to plague all the firm level studies of the 
relationship between economic and environmental performance. The next subsection addresses ways 
of reducing the problem of omitted variable bias. 
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2.4. Addressing possible omitted variable bias 
There are several ways of addressing the problem of omitted variable bias. The first and most 
appearent procedure is to try to measure the (omitted) variable and then include it in the model. 
However, good quantitative data on e.g. the quality of the management is notoriously unavailable. 
Moreover, good management may not even be measurable. Second, instrumental variable estimation 
may be applied: A variable is a valid instrument for environmental performance if it is correlated with 
the environmental performance variable and uncorrelated with the error term; or put another way, 
uncorrelated with the omitted variables. However, it is often difficult to come up with good 
instruments. One direction to look for instruments would be plant external events that are correlated 
with environmental performance and uncorrelated with management or technology. The frequency of 
regulatory inspections may appear an interesting candidate. Unfortunately, it does not seem unlikely 
that badly managed firms receive more inspections than plants with good management. Hence, the 
frequency of regulatory inspections is not likely to be uncorrelated with the omitted management 
variable.  
 
Another direction to look for instruments may be measures of greenness that are aggregated to 
industrial, regional or national levels. Such aggregates are unlikely to be correlated with the 
management of a specific plant (provided there are many plants). However, the problem with such 
aggregates is that their correlation with a specific plant's measure of environmental performance 
would not be very high, rendering estimation results in finite samples imprecise and unreliable. 
 
Finally, there is a way to address the problem of omitted variables that is easy to apply if panel data 
are available. Consider the following model:  
 
(2) = + + + +it it it i itECP a b ENP Y d v e , 
 
where Yit includes the same variables as Xi in (1), and eit is an error term. The inclusion of vi controls 
for unobserved plant characteristics, like plant location, or time invariant elements of plant technology, 
management, or employee motivation and education. Hence, to the extent that the omitted variable 
(e.g. quality of management) is constant over time, this procedure amends the problem of omitted 
variable bias.  
 
To our knowledge, only one previous study controls for unobserved firm specific effects in estimating 
the effect of environmental performance on economic performance. King and Lenox (2001) use a 
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panel data set consisting of 652 US firms for the period from 1987 to 1996. They use book values to 
construct a simplified version of Tobin's q and use this as measure of economic performance. Total 
emissions of toxic pollutants (relative to the mean emissions of the firm's sub-industry) are applied as 
measure for environmental performance. Several control variables are also included. They run 
regressions like the one represented by (2), and tend to find a positive relationship between 
environmental and economic performance. However, for some specifications the association is not 
statistically different from zero. The authors conclude that they are "unable to rule out possible 
confounding effects" (p. 113). Hence, it does not seem unlikely that the association between 
environmental and economic performance found in many previous studies could be attributable to 
unobserved variables like e.g. management or technology. In our empirical analysis, reported in 
Section 4, we elaborate on this.  
2.5. Simultaneity bias 
Simultaneity bias is another potentially serious problem that is not unlikely to plague all the firm level 
studies of the relationship between environmental and economic performance. It may be argued that 
the causality does not go from good environmental performance to profitability (only), as presupposed 
above, but (also) from economic to environmental performance (see. e.g. Wagner et al. 2002). 
Numerous reasons have been suggested to support this view. First, profitable firms may invest in new 
capital, which inevitably (and maybe even unintentionally) leads to lower emissions. Second, it may 
be easier to pay attention to stakeholders and to obey moral standards towards environmental 
responsibility when business is sound. Third, regulatory environmental agencies may be more lenient 
towards economically bad performers than profitable ones. Such two-way-causality may be 
represented by the following deterministic model: 
 
(3a) ( ),=ECP f ENP Y  
(3b) ( ), _1,=ENP g ECP ECP Y  
 
where we maintain notation from the previous sub-section, and let ECP_1 denote lagged values of 
economic performance. 
 
If the environmental performance of the firm depends on the firm's economic performance, then 
environmental performance cannot be considered an exogenous variable in (1) or (2) above. This is 
serious and renders the estimated coefficients inconsistent and biased. 
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Such considerations have led some authors to suggest estimating equations like (3a) and (3b) in a 
simultaneous econometric model, where several structural relations can be estimated at the same time 
(Wagner et al. 2002, Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2004). Such approaches are extensively used in economics to 
estimate e.g. demand and supply relations. However, for the estimated coefficients to be interpretable, 
the procedure requires that each equation is structural. This may be taken to mean that every structural 
equation is derived from theory and describes a separate aspect of the economy (Greene 2000, p. 
653).3 In our case however, it is difficult to argue, with the relatively vague theories available, that 
(3b) is derived from theory and describes a separate aspect of the economy. It is hard to see how a 
plant has any reason to separately set (3a) and (3b). Rather, why would not a plant incorporate (3b) 
when adjusting production to achieve the highest available profits? Applying the simultaneous 
econometric model in this case is therefore inappropriate as the model fails the requirement that the 
equations are structural since both the endogenous variables are "choice variables of the same 
economic unit" (Wooldridge 2002, p. 210).  
 
The problem of simultaniety bias may alternatively be addressed by applying the instrumental variable 
method. Again, a valid instrument for environmental performance in this case of endogeniety would 
be a variable that is correlated with environmental performance and uncorrelated with the error term. 
Instrumenting environmental performance in (1) by lagged values of the same variable, may reduce 
(but hardly eliminate) the problem of simultaniety bias. The reason is that lagged values of 
environonmental performance is likely to be highly correlated with present environmental 
performance, while the association between lagged values of environmental performance and the error 
term may be weaker.  
 
In the empirical part of this paper we restrict focus to consequences of omitted variable bias; leaving 
the problem of simultaneity bias for future research. Hence, our estimates should only be interpreted 
as associations. They may still serve as indications of possible causal channels between 
environomental and economic performance to be further illuminated in future work.  
                                                     
3 See e.g. Hendry (1996), Aldrich (1989), or Cooley and LeRoy (1985) for further discussions on what characterizes 
structural equations. 
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3. Data and applied variables 
3.1. Data 
The Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (NPCA) monitors the environmental performance of 
polluting operations. When a plant is granted an emission permit, the NPCA puts the plant in one of 
four so-called risk classes. Plants whose operation is considered potentially highly environmentally 
dangerous are put in risk class one, while the potentially least environmentally dangerous plants are 
placed in risk class four, etc. In addition, all plants in risk class one and two, and most plants in risk 
class three, are obliged to submit annual self-reports containing detailed information on violations, 
emissions, energy use, etc.4  
 
We use a plant level panel data set covering 1990-2001. The data set includes plants holding emission 
permits (emission data are generally unavailable for non-permit-holding plants). Plants from four 
industries are included, chemicals, basic metals, pulp and paper, and other non-metallic minerals.5 
Hence, the sample is not representative for Norwegian manufacturing plants: The (potentially) most 
polluting plants and industries are over-represented. These emission data are used to calculate 
aggregate Norwegian emissions, see e.g. Flugsrud et al. (2000). From this inventory, we have received 
plant specific emissions of greenhouse gases, acids, particles and NMVOC-equivalents (ozone 
precursors). These emission data initially originates from plants' self reports. However, the quality of 
the reported data is carefully investigated, e.g. by comparing the figures with data on energy or input 
consumption. When inconsistencies are observed, officers in NPCA or the plant are normally 
consulted, and the figure most consistent with the energy or input data may be chosen. This procedure 
secures that the firms' incentive to under-report emissions is unlikely to bias the data.  
 
Survey data on manufacturing plants are available from Statistics Norway. This extensive database 
includes a variety of plant specific data, like production, production costs, employment, and gross 
investments. We have these variables back to 1983.  
 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables used in this paper, except for the year dummies. 
Throughout the paper the logarithm of explanatory variables is applied.6 The production variable used 
                                                     
4 Golombek and Raknerud (1997) argue that firms in risk classes one and two are considered highly regulated, while other 
firms are not. 
5 NACE-code 24, 27, 21, and 26 respectively. 
6 We use the variables as given in Table 1; specifically, we always refer to the logarithm of all variables, except return on 
sales and dummies. 
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to normalize emissions is current value of production deflated to 1992. A proxy for capital stock is 
created as follows. First current values of gross investment are deflated to 1983 (using a price index 
for investments in manufacturing industries). Then the capital stock for 1983 is set to the mean of 
gross investments in 1983-1985 divided by the depreciation rate (set to7 0.08, cf. Todsen 1997). 
Finally, deflating the capital stock of the previous year and adding gross investment yields present 
year's capital stocks.  
 
Table 1: Variables and summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
ROS 1012 0.11 0.16 -1.99 0.83
Measures of environmental performace:   
  JFIs (log) 1012 -0.81 1.55 -5.38 2.01
  JFI (log) 1012 -6.26 2.10 -11.32 0.00
  Mean of JFI in sub-industry (log) 1012 -5.45 1.68 -8.83 -1.01
Capital stock (log) 981 11.97 1.40 6.07 14.93
Employees (log) 1006 5.24 0.99 0.69 7.04
Emissions relative to production:   
  Greenhouse gases (log) 813 -2.82 2.97 -13.67 0.98
  Acids (log) 723 -11.12 1.92 -16.12 -7.79
  NMVOC-equivalents (log) 821 -8.26 2.15 -14.77 -4.58
  Particles (log) 917 -9.28 2.08 -15.84 -4.52
Dummy variables:   
  Risk class 1 1012 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
  Risk class 2 1012 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
  Risk class 3/4 1012 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
  Pulp and paper sub-industry 1012 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
  Chemicals sub-industry 1012 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
  Non-metallic minerals sub-industry 1012 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
  Basic metals sub-industry 1012 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
 
3.2. Measure of economic performance (ECP) 
Several measures have been proposed and applied in previous empirical work. As most previous work 
is based on data on corporations, a range of financial data has been available. We, however, possess 
                                                     
7 We also ran the regressions reported in Section 4 with the depreciation rate alternatively set to 0.06 and 0.1. This yielded 
very similar results.  
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very disaggregate data, where virtually none of the plants alone constitute a corporation registered on 
the stock market. Measures based on stock rates are therefore unavailable. Moreover, our data is 
normally even more disaggregate than the legal units required to report to the tax authorities. This 
excludes measures based on book values, like equity, assets, or capital.8 However, return on sales 
(ROS) which is one of the commonly most included measures of economic performance,9 is available 
on plant level. ROS is calculated as sales minus variable production costs, divided by sales. Financial 
costs are not included in these production costs. This has the advantage that high environmental 
investments that may be unprofitable in the short run but profitable in the long run, would not disguise 
a possibly positive relationship between long-term economic and environmental performance when 
the data set covers a relatively short time period. Moreover, if we fail to detect such a positive 
relationship using ROS, it is unlikely that a positive relationship would be detected using a measure of 
profitability that includes costs of capital. Nevertheless, it is a general perception that ROS is highly 
correlated with other common measures of economic performance.  
3.3. Measure of environmental performance (ENP) 
In principle, a measure of the firm's environmental performance should capture the external 
(environmental) effects of the firm's activities. In practice, it is very difficult to create measures that 
capture even the most important external effects of the firm's activity. There is a growing literature on 
how to measure greenness in applied work (Tyteca 1995, Olsthoorn et al. 2001, Ebert and Welsch 
2004, Callens and Tyteca 1999). A variety of measures have been employed in previous studies of the 
relationship between environmental and economic performance. Among the more objective measures, 
percentage change in emissions of an aggregate of pollutants (Hart and Ahuja 1996, King and Lenox 
2001) or an index of emissions of various pollutants (Jaggi and Freedman 1992, Wagner et al. 2002) 
are some of the most frequently applied ones. Of course, none of these measures are fully satisfactory, 
and they may capture different aspects of environmental performance.  
 
We follow the approach of Jaggi and Freedman (1992) who construct an index consisting of several 
pollutants. First, emissions of each pollutant are normalized by production.  
 
 Emissions Productionpit pit ite =  
                                                     
8 Accounts data are often dismissed as a source for capital measurements since book values are registered at historic costs and 
the firm has incentives to choose depreciation profiles to minimize tax liabilities, see e.g. Raknerud et al. (2003) for 
elaborations. 
9 See overview provided in Griffin and Mahon (1997), Table 2. 
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Here p records emissions of pollutant ( )1,...,p P= , i denotes the firm ( )1,...,i N= , and t the calendar 
year ( )1,...,t T= . The basic idea behind this index is to say that a firm whose normalized emissions 
(epit) are low relative to other firms is green. The firm with the least emissions is the baseline:  
 
 ( )min, 1,...,minp i N pite e==  
 
Note that to capture improvements over time, emin,p is identical for all years. Hence, firm i's 
environmental performance with regard to pollutant p, denoted by Epit, can be measured as follows:  
 
 min,pit p pitE e e=  
 
This ranges from zero to one, and the firm performs better the higher the value. We define the Jaggi 
Freedman index (JFI) as follows:10 
 
 
1
1 P
it pitp
JFI E
P =
= ∑  
 
JFI ranges from zero to one, and the closer JFI is to one, the greener the firm. The correlations 
between JFI and emissions of the four pollutants are reported in Table 2. As a minimum requirement 
for an index of greenness, these correlations are highly negative (and significant).  
 
Table 2:  Pearson correlation coefficients between the measure of environmental performance 
(JFI) and the emissions relative to production of the four pollutants (p-values in 
parenthesis) 
 Emissions (relative to production) of 
 Greenhouse gases Acids VOC-eqv. Particles 
JFI -0.77 (0.00) -0.95 (0.00) -0.92 (0.00) -0.93 (0.00) 
 
We also construct average sub-industry scores of the JFI (at the 5 digit NACE-code-level in most 
cases). To control for differences in technologies etc, our measure of greenness in the regression 
analysis will be normalized by the sub-industry average of JFI. This JFI relative to sub-industri, 
denoted by JFIs, is defined as follows:  
                                                     
10 Wagner et al. (2002) normalize this index with medians of emissions for each pollutant. The correlation between the 
logarithm of the this normalized index and the logarithm of the original one is very high.  
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1
1
=
= ∑
it
it
J
jtj
JFIJFIs
JFI
J
, where 1,...,j J=  comprises the plants in i's sub-industry. 
 
In the regression analysis, we will also include the denominator (mean of JFI in sub-industry) as a 
control variable.  
4. Empirical results 
We start by applying methods very similar to the ones applied in most previous studies, and show that 
such methods yield a positive association between our measures of environmental and economic 
performance. Then we address the problem of omitted unobserved variables, and find that by 
accounting for such variables the correlation between environmental and economic performance is no 
longer statistically different from zero.  
4.1. Simple approaches 
Like in many previous studies, a positive association exists in the data of the present study too: The 
Pearson correlations coefficient between our measures of environmental and economic performance is 
0.17; statistically significant at any conventional level.  
 
The OLS regression on equation (1) includes the following variables. ECPi is return on sales for plant 
i, ENPi is the Jaggi-Freedman index normalized by sub-industry average11 and Xi is a vector of control 
variables.12 We include the mean of ENP in the plant's sub-industry, capital stock, number of 
employees, a dummy indicating that the plant is not heavily regulated, and year dummies as controls.  
From Table 3 we see that the estimate of b is positive (0.009) and clearly statistically significant, again 
indicating a positive relationship between environmental and economic performance. But the 
correlation has dropped compared to the simple correlation coefficient estimated above,13 which may 
indicate that greenness is positively correlated with other factors that normally characterize profitable 
                                                     
11 The ENP-variables and the employment variable are lagged one period in an attempt to reduce the problem of simultaneity 
bias, see Section 2.5. This is done in the panel regression in the next subsection too. Neither here nor in the next subsection 
did the alternative approach of instrumenting present values with lagged ones for these variables change the main qualitative 
results.  
12 Some previous studies have included lagged values of the environmental performance variable, e.g. to take account of the 
conjecture that green investments might be costly in the short run but beneficial in the longer run. However, as our measure 
of economic performance is a short-term measure that does not include financial costs, such lagging should be unnecessary in 
our case. Nevertheless, we ran all regressions including more lags of ENP. This did not appear to reveal any systematic 
patterns.  
13 From the regression reported in Table 3, the corresponding partial correlation coefficient can be computed to be 0.09, see 
e.g. Greene (2000) p. 233ff. 
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plants. The coefficient on mean environmental performance in sub-industry is negative. This indicates 
that, although plants being greener than their sub-industry peers have higher economic performance, 
the economic performance is negatively associated with the mean of ENP in the plant's sub-industry: 
Economic performance is better in sub-industries with lower environmental performance. Capital 
stock and low regulatory stringency (Risk Class 3/4) are positively associated with economic 
performance. The year dummies indicate that environmental performance of firms was above the 1991 
level after 1992. However, after the peak in the mid 1990s it declined.  
 
Although (1) controls for several apparently relevant factors, unobserved variables like management 
or technology could be the main reason for the positive correlation. In the next section we control for 
time invariant unobserved plant characteristics.  
 
Table 3:  Results of the OLS regression on the pooled data with economic performance as 
dependent variable 
ECP Coef. Robust Std.Err. t P t>  
ENP  0.009 0.003  2.74 0.006 
Mean of ENP in sub-industry -0.010 0.004 -2.50 0.013 
Capital stock  0.046 0.007  6.50 0.000 
Employees -0.027 0.011 -2.41 0.016 
Risk class 3/4  0.084 0.017  4.80 0.000 
Year dummies (t1991 excluded):     
    t1992 -0.008 0.034 -0.24 0.811 
    t1993  0.048 0.022  2.20 0.028 
    t1994  0.077 0.022  3.51 0.000 
    t1995  0.113 0.022  5.18 0.000 
    t1996  0.080 0.022  3.58 0.000 
    t1997  0.055 0.021  2.69 0.007 
    t1998  0.067 0.020  3.40 0.001 
    t1999  0.064 0.020  3.19 0.001 
    t2000  0.069 0.021  3.25 0.001 
    t2001  0.020 0.031  0.64 0.521 
Constant -0.405 0.083 -4.90 0.000 
Number of obs. 898    
F (15,882) 11.60    
Prob > F 0.000    
R-squared 0.13    
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4.2. Controlling for unobserved plant specific effects 
We control for unobserved plant specific effects in accordance with (2) above using panel data. The 
regression includes the following variables: Y comprises the same variables as X (see previous 
subsection). We also include v to control for unobserved time invariant plant characteristics, like plant 
location or sub-industry, or time invariant elements of plant technology, management, or employee 
motivation and education. 
 
The regression results from a random effect specification (see e.g. Baltagi 2001) are reported in Table 
4. Formal tests reveal that unobserved plant specific effects do belong in the model.14 This indicates 
that the pooled regression reported in the previous subsection is inappropriate, e.g. because of omitted 
unobserved variables. The coefficient on environmental performance has declined, but it remains 
positive (0.002). It is, however, no longer statistically significant. The estimated coefficients of all the 
other variables remain very similar.  
 
To sum up, it seems like the association between environmental and economic performance tends to 
dissolve when other plant characteristics are controlled for. This indicates that variables often omitted 
in previous studies, like e.g. management or technology, are not unlikely to be important when 
possible causal channels between environmental and economic performance are to be illuminated.  
 
                                                     
14 A Breusch/Pagan Lagrangian test for no individual effects can be rejected at any conventional level of significance. A 
Hausman test of the hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model cannot be 
rejected at any conventional level of significance. The latter may be taken to indicate that the applied random effect 
specification is preferred over a fixed effect specification.  
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Table 4:  Results of the random effects panel regression with economic performance as 
dependent variable 
ECP Coef. Std.Err. z P z>  
ENV  0.002 0.005  0.45 0.655 
Mean of ENV in sub-industry -0.012 0.005 -2.34 0.019 
Capital stock  0.044 0.009  4.82 0.000 
Employees -0.025 0.014 -1.75 0.081 
Risk class 3/4  0.084 0.030  2.79 0.005 
Year dummies (t1991 excluded):     
    t1992 -0.012 0.021 -0.58 0.563 
    t1993  0.043 0.021  2.00 0.045 
    t1994  0.072 0.021  3.34 0.001 
    t1995  0.108 0.021  5.03 0.000 
    t1996  0.074 0.022  3.45 0.001 
    t1997  0.050 0.022  2.29 0.022 
    t1998  0.062 0.022  2.86 0.004 
    t1999  0.061 0.022  2.78 0.005 
    t2000  0.065 0.022  2.96 0.003 
    t2001  0.017 0.022  0.76 0.449 
Constant -0.408 0.108 -3.78 0.000 
Number of obs. (i,t) 898 (85,11)    
R-squared 0.12    
Wald chi2 (15) 82.60    
Prob > chi2 0.000    
 
5. Conclusions 
We argue that previous quantitative empirical firm level studies of the relationship between 
environmental and economic performance have not taken the problem of omitted variable bias or 
simultaneity bias sufficiently seriously. Both these problems render associations estimated in previous 
studies unreliable. Moreover, the empirical methods applied are incapable of illuminating the causal 
links between environmental and economic performance. Hence, results from such studies are 
inappropriate as support for a claim that it pays for firms to be green. 
 
When not addressing the problem of omitted variables, our data reveal, like several previous studies, a 
positive association between environmental and economic performance. However, if unobserved 
variables like good management or more efficient technology cause both better environmental and 
economic performance, we could observe a positive association between environmental and economic 
performance even if they were unrelated. When we account for unobserved plant specific effects, the 
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positive association between environmental and economic performance dissolves. Hence, this further 
indicates that the conclusion of previous empirical studies that it pays to be green is premature. We 
may add, however, that the opposite conclusion, that it does not pay to be green, is no less premature. 
 
Our estimations reveal a negative partial association between economic performance and the mean 
environmental performance of the sub-industry. This may be taken to indicate that present 
environmental regulations of more polluting sub-industries do not provide sufficient economic 
incentives to render emphasis on environmental performance clearly profitable. More importantly, 
however, the present paper reveals the limitations of our knowledge on the mechanisms governing the 
effects of environmental performance on firms' profits. Generally it should be considered unsettled 
whether good environmental performance improves economic performance or whether it is the other 
way around.  
 
In addition to addressing the methodological concern raised in this paper, future research should 
attempt to identify what characterizes firms with a strong association between environmental and 
economic performance, and also what elements of environmental performance that is most likely to be 
improvable without resulting in worse economic performance: Which firms could become green from 
self-interest and for which would strict regulations be necessary to protect the environment? Such 
investigations may provide helpful information in designing regulations and improving enforcement. 
To condition e.g. inspection frequency on plants' characteristics has been found to improve overall 
compliance (Harrington 1988, Telle 2004).  
 
Case studies seem to indicate that it can be in the firms' self-interest to pursue good environmental 
performance regarding some aspects of environmental regulations, while strict enforcement may be 
crucial to ensure compliance with other aspects of the regulations. As several authors have pointed out 
(King and Lenox 2001, Reinhardt 1999), the most relevant question is presumably not "does it pay to 
be green", but rather when and for whom may it pay to be green. 
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